Both motor prediction and conceptual congruency between preview and action-effect contribute to explicit judgment of agency

Atsushi Sato*

*この論文の責任著者

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿学術論文査読

131 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

The sense of agency is the sense that one is causing an action. The inferential account of the sense of agency proposes that we experience the sense of agency when we infer that one's own thoughts are the cause of an action. According to this account, the inference occurs when a thought appears in consciousness prior to an action, is consistent with the action, and is not accompanied by conspicuous other causes of the action. Alternatively, a predictive account of the sense of agency proposes that sensory prediction based on efferent (motor) information plays a critical role in generating the sense of agency. The present study investigated whether the sense of agency depended primarily on the conceptual congruence between preview information (i.e., to elicit a thought) and actual sensory feedback as suggested by the inferential account, or whether it depended primarily on the sensory-motor congruence between prediction and actual sensory feedback as suggested by the predictive account. The results indicated that both of these factors did contribute to the sense of agency, although sensory-motor congruence appears to have a more robust impact.

本文言語英語
ページ(範囲)74-83
ページ数10
ジャーナルCognition
110
1
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 2009/01

ASJC Scopus 主題領域

  • 実験心理学および認知心理学
  • 言語および言語学
  • 発達心理学および教育心理学
  • 言語学および言語
  • 認知神経科学

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