TY - JOUR
T1 - Game-theoretic modelling and analysis of strategic investments for PV and shared battery
AU - Tanaka, Taichi
AU - Carnerero, A. Daniel
AU - Li, Mengmou
AU - Wasa, Yasuaki
AU - Hirata, Kenji
AU - Hatanaka, Takeshi
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - In this paper, we introduce a strategic model for users and a manager in a community, considering investments in photovoltaic (PV) panels and a shared battery. We also analyse how their strategic behaviour influences the overall social welfare within the community. We first formulate the investment optimization problems for the users and the manager explicitly considering electricity exchanges, where users invest in PV panels and the manager invests in a battery. Considering interactions of information and electricity, the strategic model, which combines the investment optimization problems mentioned above, can be formulated as a game. Then, we point out that the formulated game does not always guarantee the existence of a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). To overcome the problem, we present new utility functions that ensure the existence of an equilibrium through potential game theory. Finally, we conduct a case study with actual electricity data to numerically analyse the impact of the strategic behaviour on social welfare as well as the advantages of battery sharing in the presence of such strategic behaviour.
AB - In this paper, we introduce a strategic model for users and a manager in a community, considering investments in photovoltaic (PV) panels and a shared battery. We also analyse how their strategic behaviour influences the overall social welfare within the community. We first formulate the investment optimization problems for the users and the manager explicitly considering electricity exchanges, where users invest in PV panels and the manager invests in a battery. Considering interactions of information and electricity, the strategic model, which combines the investment optimization problems mentioned above, can be formulated as a game. Then, we point out that the formulated game does not always guarantee the existence of a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). To overcome the problem, we present new utility functions that ensure the existence of an equilibrium through potential game theory. Finally, we conduct a case study with actual electricity data to numerically analyse the impact of the strategic behaviour on social welfare as well as the advantages of battery sharing in the presence of such strategic behaviour.
KW - Sharing economy
KW - energy management system
KW - game theory
KW - optimization
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85195648347&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/18824889.2024.2347041
DO - 10.1080/18824889.2024.2347041
M3 - 学術論文
AN - SCOPUS:85195648347
SN - 1882-4889
VL - 17
SP - 222
EP - 232
JO - SICE Journal of Control, Measurement, and System Integration
JF - SICE Journal of Control, Measurement, and System Integration
IS - 1
ER -