TY - GEN
T1 - A dynamic output integration mechanism for LQG power networks with random type parameters
AU - Matsui, Shun
AU - Murao, Toshiyuki
AU - Hirata, Kenji
AU - Uchida, Kenko
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 IEEE.
PY - 2015/9/8
Y1 - 2015/9/8
N2 - We consider a dynamic game model of power networks with generators and/or consumers, called agents, and one public commission, called the utility; a game with a prescribed dynamic mechanism is performed such that each agent decides a private control to minimize its own cost functional, and the utility manages information transmissions between the utility and agents and decides command signals, called prices, to minimize a public cost functional. In this problem setting, we propose a dynamic output integration mechanism for LQG power networks. The LQG power networks is a generic linear Gaussian model of power networks, which is motivated by so-called average system frequency models. In each model of the agents, we include the type parameter presenting each agent's private information. Also, we consider the estimation in calculation of prices by the utility. The proposed mechanism satisfies the public optimality of the optimal private controls, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality, in both fixed horizon and receding horizon cases.
AB - We consider a dynamic game model of power networks with generators and/or consumers, called agents, and one public commission, called the utility; a game with a prescribed dynamic mechanism is performed such that each agent decides a private control to minimize its own cost functional, and the utility manages information transmissions between the utility and agents and decides command signals, called prices, to minimize a public cost functional. In this problem setting, we propose a dynamic output integration mechanism for LQG power networks. The LQG power networks is a generic linear Gaussian model of power networks, which is motivated by so-called average system frequency models. In each model of the agents, we include the type parameter presenting each agent's private information. Also, we consider the estimation in calculation of prices by the utility. The proposed mechanism satisfies the public optimality of the optimal private controls, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality, in both fixed horizon and receding horizon cases.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84957635141&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ASCC.2015.7244775
DO - 10.1109/ASCC.2015.7244775
M3 - 会議への寄与
AN - SCOPUS:84957635141
T3 - 2015 10th Asian Control Conference: Emerging Control Techniques for a Sustainable World, ASCC 2015
BT - 2015 10th Asian Control Conference
A2 - Selamat, Hazlina
A2 - Ramli, Hafiz Rashidi Haruna
A2 - Faudzi, Ahmad Athif Mohd
A2 - Rahman, Ribhan Zafira Abdul
A2 - Ishak, Asnor Juraiza
A2 - Soh, Azura Che
A2 - Ahmad, Siti Anom
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 10th Asian Control Conference, ASCC 2015
Y2 - 31 May 2015 through 3 June 2015
ER -